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CHAPTER 11 
Zoning and Land Use 
RICHARD G. HUBER* 
§ 11.1. Municipal Regulation of BUiboards-Aesthetic Zoning-Com-
mercial Free Speech. During the 1981 Survey year, the Appeals Court ex-
amhied the validity of billboard restrictions imposed under local zoning by-
laws. In Maurice Callahan and Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Board, • the 
plaintiff billboard owners challenged the denial of their billboard permit 
renewals as violative of the First Amendment. The plaintiff claimed that a 
town of Lenox bylaw that prohibited all off premises signs infringed the 
plaintiff's constitutionally protected freedom of expression. 2 
The regulation of billboard number, height, and placement is an exercise 
of a community's police power. Billboard regulation is justified as a means 
of promoting the public safety and general welfare. 3 In Massachusetts, the 
Supreme Judicial Court has held that aesthetic considerations provide an 
adequate basis for the regulation of billboard advertising. 4 Recent United 
States Supreme Court decisions have upheld local ordinances restricting 
commercial speech based upon the police power.' The scope of the police 
power as a restriction on noncommercial communication is, however, far 
from settled. 
In Callahan, the Lenox zoning bylaw effectively eliminated all off prem-
ises signs and billboards. 6 The byfaw permitted one or two small signs for 
each residential lot, limiting the content of the signs to information identify-
ing the premises and occupants.' The bylaw limited the commercial and 
industrial districts, containing the plaintiff's billboards, to signs identifying 
the location, occup~ts, services and products available on the premises.• 
• RICHARD G. HUBER is Dean and Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The 
author gratefully and respectfully acknowledges the research and writing assistance provided 
by James P. O'Hara and Michael J. Pise. 
§ 11.1. ' 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1760, 427 N.E.2d 25. 
' Id. at 1762, 427 N.E.2d at 25. 
' 1 & 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZoNING§§ 7.16, 15.82- 88 (2d ed. 1977). 
• See John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Board, 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 
(1975); see Huber, Zoning and Lond Use, 1976 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw§ 15.15. 
' See generally Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1764, 417 N.E.2d at 28. 
' § 7.8.1 of Lenox bylaw. 
• Id. at§ 7.9.1. 
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General regulations for all signs including the number, location and permit-
ted exceptions to the general regulations were included in the bylaw.' 
In reviewing the applications for the plaintiff's permit renewals, the Out-
door Advertising Board determined that the plaintiff's signs were in viola-
tion of the local zoning bylaw, thereby providing the grounds for denial. 10 
Judicial review of the decision by the superior court resulted in a summary 
judgment for the Outdoor Advertising Board. 11 The superior court relied on 
John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Board12 as controlling au-
thority in upholding the validity of the Lenox billboard restriction. u The 
plaintiff then sought review by the Appeals Court. Addressing the first 
amendment claim, the Appeals Court held that the zoning prohibition 
constituted a restriction on commercial speech rather than noncommercial 
speech. 14 Because the lack of restriction on noncommercial expression was 
not restricted, the plaintiff was precluded from utilizing the overbreadth 
doctrine. The overbreadth doctrine allows a party to rely upon the ordi-
nance's effect on the entire community instead of the more limited effect on 
the parties before the court. 15 Thus, the Court found it unnecessary to eval-
uate a local zoning board's prohibition of noncommercial, ideological com-
munication because the record below indicated that the billboards in ques-
tion had never displayed any form of noncommercial communication. 16 
Examining the bylaw as a commercial expression restriction, the Appeals 
Court held that the recent United States Supreme Court test for determining 
the validity of such restrictions had been satisfled. 17 The test as explained in 
Central Hudson v. Public Service Commission 1' requires: 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the 
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at 
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether 
the asserted governmental interest is substantial, If both inquiries yield 
positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances 
the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest. 19 
The Appeals Court then compared the Lenox bylaw to a San Diego, Cali-
fornia ordinance recently examined by the United States Supreme Court in 
• Id. at§ 7.7.1. 
•• 311 Code of Mass. Regs§ 3.04(7) (1978). 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1760-61, 427 N.E.2d at 26. 
12 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (197S). 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1762, 427 N.E.2d at 27. 
•• /d. at 176S, 427 N.E.2d at 28. 
" See Metromedia, Inc., 4S3 U.S. at S04 n.ll; Central Hudson Public Service Commn. 447 
U.S. SS1, S63 (1980). 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 176S, 427 N.E.2d at 28-29. 
11 /d. at 1766, 427 N.E.2d at 29. 
II 447 u.s. SS1 (1980). 
"/d. at S63. 
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Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego. 20 In Metromedia, the Supreme 
Court upheld the validity of the San Diego ordinance as a proper restriction 
on commercial speech. 21 The restriction promoted governmental interests in 
traffic safety and city appearance. zz The Supreme Court invalidated the 
ordinance, however, because noncommercial expression was unconstitu-
tionally restricted. 23 The Appeals Court applied the Metromedia rationale 
only as to commercial speech restriction because in Callahan the plaintiff's 
billboard did not convey noncommercial messages. 
The Appeals Court's approval of the Metromedia rationale should serve 
to alert local zoning authorities to the increasingly unsettled nature of zon-
ing restrictions on billboard advertising. Although the court cites Metro-
media with approval to support the validity of the Lenox bylaw, the Metro-
media decision does not represent as strong a precedent as the Appeals 
Court seems to indicate. A closer examination of Metromedia reveals that a 
community's restrictions on billboards will be scrutinized closely. 
In Metromedia, the owners of some 500 to 800 outdoor advertising dis-
play signs24 challenged the validity of a local ordinance restricting billboard 
advertising. The United States Supreme Court reversed the California 
Supreme Court in a plurality decision2' holding the ordinance to be an im-
proper exercise of the police power. The decision has been characterized as 
a virtual Tower of Babel for city planning commissions and zoning boards 
from which no definitive principles can be clearly drawn. 26 
The San Diego ordinance prohibited all outdoor advertising except signs 
identifying the premises, the owner and occupant of the site, or signs adver-
tising goods or services available on the premises. 27 Generally, on site com-
mercial advertising was allowed provided it was related to the premises. 
Metromedia, Inc. alleged that the ordinance represented total prohibition 
of the outdoor advertising industry, a confiscation in violation of the four-
20 453 u.s. 490 (1981). 
2
' /d. at 512. 
22 /d. at 507. 
23 /d. at 521. 
24 /d. at 496. Defined by the California Supreme Court as a rigidly assembled sign, display 
or divide permanently attached to a building or. other inherently permanent structure constitut-
ing, or used for the display of, a commercial or other advertisement to the public. Metromedia, 
Inc. v. San Diego, 26 Cal.3d 848, 852 n.2, 64 Cal. Rptr. 510, 513 n.2, 610 P.2d 407, 410 n.2 
(1980). 
25 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. at 521. Justice White wrote and an-
nounced the opinion of the Court joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell. Justice 
Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in judgment. Justices Stevens, Burger and 
Rehnquist dissented writing separately. 
26 453 U.S. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
" San Diego Ordinance No. 10795 (New Series) enacted March 14, 1972 (cited in 453 U.S. at 
493 n.1). 
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teenth amendment and a violation of the first amendment rights of free ex-
pression. 21 The trial court held the ordinance to be a violation of first 
amendment rights and an improper exercise of the police power. 29 The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision solely on the 
basis of its finding concerning the police power. 30 The California Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the city was promoting legitimate interests of 
public safety and the general welfare, and rejected all first amendment 
claims. 31 The appeal to the United States Supreme Court involved claims of 
first and fourteenth amendment violations by the city of San Diego. 32 
Justice White delivered the Court's plurality opinion noting preliminarily 
that at times societal interests may outweigh first amendment values. 33 A 
community regulating the noncommunicative aspects of billboard advertis-
ing must balance its interests in regulating the large, immobile and perma-
nent structures with the individual's right to expression. 34 Justice White 
assessed Metromedia's first amendment claims in terms of the restriction on 
commercial and noncommercial speech. 
The plurality found that the San Diego ordinance was a valid restriction 
on commercial speech, although the plurality noted that a valid prohibition 
of commercial speech does not necessarily validate restrictions on noncom-
mercial speech. 35 The city's justifications for restricting commercial com-
munication did not convince the plurality to sustain the prohibition of non-
commercial expression contained in the ordinance. The plurality held that a 
city "(m]ay not conclude that the communication of commercial informa-
tion concerning goods and services connected with a particular site is of 
greater value than the communication of noncommercial messages." 36 A 
city does not have the same range of choices when deciding to distinguish 
between the value of commercial and noncommercial speech. Because some 
noncommercial messages were allowed to be conveyed on some San Diego 
billboards, the Court reasoned that all billboards must be allowed to convey 
noncommercial messages. 37 
21 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 4S3 U.S. at 498. 
•• /d. at 497 . 
•• /d. 
" /d. at 497-98. 
,. Id. at 498. 
"Id. at SOl. 
•• /d. at S02. 
" Id. at S04..0S. In Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 42S U.S. 748 
(1976), the Court held that speech proposing a commercial transaction was entitled to some 
First Amendment protection, illthough not equivalent to the protection extended to noncom-
mercial speech. 
"Id. at S13. 
" /d. at SIS. 
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The plurality opinion concluded by determining the proper level of judi-
cial review of the ordinance as a restriction on first amendment rights. Jus-
tice White stated that a reviewing court must find more than a rational rela-
tionship between the governmental interests and the statutory means of pro-
moting those interests. 31 The San Diego ordinance was invalid because the 
city did not show a heightened relationship. 39 
Unlike the plurality, Justice Brennan viewed the San Diego ordinance as a 
total ban on outdoor advertising. Brennan asserted that the ordinance was 
invalid, and the plurality's commercial, noncommercial expression dichot-
omy was constitutionally unsound. 40 The concurrence suggested that a city 
may ban billboards provided that three standards are met. 41 First, the gov-
ernment must show that it has a sufficiently substantial interest in banning 
the billboards. Second, the governmental interest must be directly furthered 
by the ban. Third, the government must show that anything less than the 
total ban would not promotethe governmental interest as well. 
The concurrence rejected the plurality's position that the ordinance valid-
ly regulated commercial expression. 42 The concurrence contended that the 
commercial-noncommercial approach of the plurality would open the door 
to situations in which noncommercial speech could be prohibited under the 
guise of commercial speech regulation, subject only to the discretion of a 
local zoning authority. 43 This potential for intrusive government restriction 
on legitimate expression is a factor in favor of invalidating the ordinance. 44 
Justice Stevens, dissenting, agreed that the ordinance constituted a total 
ban of outdoor advertising45 but found the ordinance constitutionally 
valid. 46 Finding no indication of governmental bias and no evidence of a 
lack of suitable means of alternate communication, Justice Stevens held the 
ordinance valid. He explained that the essential concern embodied in the 
First Amendment is that the government does not dictate the topics for 
public debate or impose its viewpoint on the public. 47 
Chief Justice Burger's dissent characterizes the plurality opinion as typi-
fying a federal body usurping authority from a local government. 41 The 
Chief Justice viewed the controversy as involving the basic authority of 
" /d. at 517. 
" /d. at 521. 
•• /d. at 522 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
" Id. at 527 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
42 /d. at 534-40 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
" /d. at 537·38 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
" /d. at 540 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
" /d. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
" /d. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
" /d. at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
" /d. at 556 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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local government to protect its citizens' legitimate interests in city ap-
pearance and traffic safety. The duty of the Court in reviewing this type of 
statute is to determine whether the legislative approach is essentially neutral 
and leaves open other means for conveying the restricted communication. 
The Chief Justice noted that the Court should not make the primary policy 
decision, which is better made at the local level. 49 The Chief Justice con-
cluded that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power, finding a 
wide range of alternatives available for communicating the restricted 
messages. 50 Also, in his opinion the record indicated no attempt by San 
Diego to suppress any category of messages or any particular point of 
view." 
In conclusioJ1., local zoning authorities should find little consolation in 
the Metromedta decision as a guide for evaluating billboard restrictions. 
The decision does indicate that although city aesthetics are a legitimate ob-
jective of the police power, any restriction of first amendment rights must 
be justified fully by the local authorities. 
§ 11.2. Zoning-Live Entertainment-First Amendment. The power 
of a municipality to enact comprehensive zoning ordinances consistently 
has been upheld since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 1 Nevertheless, zoning ordinances are still 
open to constitutional challenge on the grounds that the ordinances repre-
sent impermissible governmental intrusions on individual liberty interests 
protected by the United States Constitution. 2 The United States Supreme 
Court, during the Survey year, examined the tension between a 
community's exercise of its zoning power and an individual's exercise of 
first amendment rights of free expression. In Schad v. Borough of Mount 
Ephraim, 3 a plurality of the Court reversed the criminal convictions of 
bookstore operators charged with violating the local zoning ordinance pro-
hibiting live entertainment in commercial zones. Although the borough was 
empowered to enact comprehensive zoning ordinances, the overbreadth of 
the live entertainment ordinance and the insufficient justification for the 
prohibition by Mount Ephraim constituted an unlawful intrusion on first 
amendment rights. 4 
•• /d. at 561 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
•• ld. at 562-63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
" /d. at 562 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
§ 11.2. 1 272 U.S. 365 (1926); See generally 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING§ 
3.0 et seq. (2d ed. 1977). 
' 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1 at 3.10. 
' 452 u.s. 61 (1981). 
• Id. at 71-72. 
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In Schad, appellants operated an adult bookstore, selling adult books, 
magazines and films. The store also provided private showings of adult 
films in coin operated booths.' The bookstore was located in a commercial 
zone6 of Mount Ephraim and successfully had obtained from the borough 
an amusement license permitting the coin-operated film booths. 7 These 
booths were later modified to allow customers to view nude dancers behind 
a glass panel of the booth. • Complaints soon were filed against the 
operators of the bookstore, charging that the dancing violated a Mount 
Ephraim zoning ordinance prohibiting live entertainment in a commercial 
zone. 9 
The operators were convicted and fined in municipal court for violating 
the zoning ordinance. 10 The Camden County Court took the case on appeal. 
After a trial de novo on the municipal court record, the operators again 
were convicted. 11 Responding to the first and fourteenth amendment 
claims, the county court agreed that live nude dancing was constitutionally 
protected by the first amendment, but the matter before the court con-
cerned only zoning regulation so the court was not required to evaluate the 
appellants' constitutional claims. 12 The court supported this position by cit-
ing Young v. American Mini Theatres, 13 stating "[t]he mere fact that the 
commercial exploitation of material protected by the first amendment is 
subject to zoning and other licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason 
for invalidating these ordinances." u The Appellate Division of the New 
Jersey Superior Court endorsed the reasoning of the Camden County Court 
and affirmed the convictions. 1' The New Jersey Supreme Court denied fur-
ther review. 16 The basis of appellant's appeal to the United States Supreme 
Court was that the criminal penalties imposed under a zoning ordinance 
prohibiting all live entertainment in areas zoned for commercial use violated 
their right of free expression guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amend-
ment. 
Generally, a zoning ordinance is a type of legislative act presumed to be 
constitutional and valid. 17 A zoning ordinance affecting only property 
'Id. at 62. 
6 Id. 
'Id. 
'Id. 
• Id. at 63. 
10 Id. at 64. 
" Id. 
" Id . 
.. 427 u.s. so (1976). 
14 452 U.S. at 64 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 62). 
"Id. at 65. 
16 Id. 
17 See generally 2 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZoNING§ 3.14. 
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rights will withstand judicial review successfully if it is rationally related to 
legitimate state concerns and does not deprive the owner of the economical-
ly viable use of his property. 11 When, however, a zoning ordinance affects a 
constitutionally protected "liberty" interest, the reviewing court must 
evaluate the ordinance with a higher level of scrutiny. 19 The court must 
determine whether: (a) the ordinance is narrowly drawn; 20 (b) the ordinance 
furthers a substantial government interest; 21 and (c) those government inter-
ests could not be served by means less intrusive on the protected activity. 22 
This application of heightened scrutiny relates to the government interests 
advanced by the ordinance and the means chosen to further those govern-
ment interests. 23 
The Supreme Court's plurality opinion2~ reversed the criminal convic-
tions because Mount Ephraim had not adequately justified its infringement 
on the bookstore operator's First Amendment right of free expression. 25 
Justice White, writing the plurality opinion, at the outset affirmed the prin-
ciple that entertainment is a protected form of expression under the First 
Amendment and that the presence of nudity does not justify the withdrawal 
of First Amendment protection. 26 
The plurality opinion evaluated the validity of the zoning ordinance by 
employing a two-step process. Step one involved a determination of the 
level of scrutiny to be applied to the statute. The borough argued that, be-
cause a zoning ordinance was involved, the ordinance only need be rational-
ly related to a legitimate government interest. The plurality disagreed, hold-
ing that the borough's ordinance "(s]ignificantly limits communicative ac-
tivity within the borough," 27 thereby requiring the highest level of scrutiny 
to be applied by a reviewing court. 28 Mount Ephraim's reliance on Young v. 
American Movie Theatres, Inc. was not accepted by the plurality. 29 Young 
had regulated the density of adult movie theatres, while not totally prohibit-
" 452 U.S. at 68 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980); Village of Belle 
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). 
" Id. 
2o Id. 
21 Id. 
22 /d. at 70. 
23 Id. at 71. 
24 Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court; Justice Blackmun fl.led a concurring 
opinion; Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Stewart; Justice Stevens an 
opinion concurring in judgment; Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice 
Rehnquist. 
" Id. at 72. 
26 Id. at 65. 
21 Id. at 71. 
2o Id. 
20 Id. at 71-72. 
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ing the theaters in commercial districts. 30 The Mount Ephraim ordinance, as 
enforced, banned· all live entertainment without adequate justification. 
The borough argued that live entertainment in the commercial zone 
would conflict with the community plan to create a commercial area cater-
ing only to the immediate needs of its residents. 31 The immediae needs 
would involve those types of items usually purchased outside the borough, 
which were occasionally forgotten by residents, such as items generally 
found at a convenience store. 32 This argument was dismissed as patently in-
sufficient owing to obvious contradictions in the text of the full zoning ordi-
nances which clearly allowed a wide range of commercial uses far beyond 
the immediate needs of the borough's residents." 
Mount Ephraim's second justification was that live entertainment may be 
excluded in order to avoid problems with parking, trash, police protection 
and medical facilities. 34 This justification failed because the borough pro-
duced no evidence supporting the existence of these problems. 35 The plurali-
ty found that it is not self-evidentthat any greater problems would be posed 
that did not currently exist incident to existing permitted uses under the or-
dinance. 36 The ordinance was not drawn narrowly enough to accommodate 
the problems occurring owing to live commercial entertainment and no 
evidence was presented to show that a less intrusive ordinance would not 
meet the needs of the town. 37 
As a "time, place and manner" restriction Mount Ephraim argued that 
its ordinance is reasonable but the borough did not support its reasons for 
prohibiting live entertainment while permitting other commercial uses. 38 
The crucial question for such a restriction is "[w]hether the manner of ex-
pression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular 
place at a particular time." 39 Mount Ephraim did not substantiate there-
striction's validity because the restriction left open no alternative avenues of 
communication. 40 The presence of similar live entertainment in neighboring 
communities was irrelevant because the residents of Mount Ephraim had no 
political control over permitted uses in other communities. 41 
•• Id. at 71. 
" ld. at 72. 
" Id. 
" ld. at 73. 
" ld. 
" ld. 
,. ld. at 73-74. 
" ld. at 74. 
" ld. at 74-75. 
" Id. at 75 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972)). 
•• ld. at 75-76. 
" Id. at 76-77. 
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The White plurality did not find that a community may not restrict first 
amendment activities; the plurality stated only that a community's restric-
tions will be held to the highest level of scrutiny in terms of the substantial 
government interests advanced by the ordinance as well as the means for 
promoting these interests. 42 Mount Ephraim simply did not substantiate its 
restrictive zoning ordinance adequately. 43 
In a separate concurrence, Justice Blackmun joined the plurality opinion 
to clarify two points. The first point was that a local zoning ordinance must 
withstand more than the minimal scrutiny of a rational relationship test 
when Constitutional rights are restricted. 44 Justice Blackmun emphasized 
that the plurality opinion should make it clear that "where First Amend-
ment interests are at stake, zoning regulations have no . . . 'talismatic im-
munity from Constitutional challenge.' " 45 In his second point, Justice 
Blackmun agreed with the plurality's position.that Mount Ephraim could 
not justify its elimination of live entertainment by showing that other near-
by localities provide the locally restricted entertainment. 46 
Justice Powell's opinion, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred with the 
plurality opinion that Mount Ephraim failed to justify its broad restriction 
on protected expression. 47 The concurrence left open the possibility that a 
more carefully drafted ordinance validly could regulate or ban live commer-
cial entertainment. 48 
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, agreed in principle with the 
dissent's position that although nude dancing was protected by the first 
amendment, Mount Ephraim could prohibit it. 49 Owing to the ambiguity in 
the record and the broadness of the statute, however, the borough did not 
carry its burden of demonstrating that a uniform policy of regulation exist-
ed and was enforced in a content-neutral fashion. 50 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented, viewing the issue in 
the case as whether Mount Ephraim could ban nude dancing which was 
employed as "bait" to induce customers into adult bookstores. 51 While the 
dissent acknowledged that first amendment rights might be affected by the 
broad restriction, the dissent found the ordinance valid. 52 The dissent stated 
42 /d. at 67 . 
., /d. at 72. 
•• Id. at 77 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
•• Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 75 
(1976)). 
•• /d. at 77-78 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
47 /d. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring). 
•• /d. (Powell, J., concurring). 
•• Id. at 83 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
•• Id. at 83-84 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
" /d. at 86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
" /d. at 86-87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
10
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that the borough had acted only to keep this type of entertainment off its 
doorsteps, while not suppressing any point of view or any category of 
ideas. n The dissent attached importance to the principle that federal court 
power to alter a community's choice of government should be exercised 
sparingly. 54 The dissent made no comment on the adequacy of Mount 
Ephraim's justifications for enacting the statute. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Schad is in accord with recent Massa-
chusetts decisions examining the validity of local police power ordinances 
restricting the exercise of first amendment rights." As an expression of na-
tional policy, Schad assumes that first amendment rights are not restricted 
readily. Most cases similar to Mount Ephraim fail because the zoning (or 
other similar) laws are adopted without adequate proof of serious deleteri-
ous effect of the activity restricted and tend to be merely broad expressions 
of the moral standards of the community and its agents. Local governments 
should muster facts that indicate clearly an adverse impact of the activity on 
the public. Absent such facts, the first amendment rights of free expression 
cannot be limited. 
§ 11.3. Zoning-Standing as a Person Aggrieved. In order for a person 
to satisfy standing requirements in an action for judicial review of a deci-
sion of the Board of Appeals or special permit granting authority, one must 
be a "person aggrieved." 1 The Appeals Court, in Owens v. Board of Ap-
peals of Belmont, 2 ruled that standing is satisfied if two requirements are 
met. First, a party must be a nearby property owner who received notice 
pursuant to chapter 40A, section 11 of the General Laws, or an abutter or 
an abutter of an abutter. 3 The facts of the case must raise the possibility of 
tangible harm to the person's property.• Second, the person claiming that 
he is aggrieved has to assert an interest in having the district in which he 
owns property remain uniform.' Persons have no standing before the board 
of appeals if their property lies some distance from the site, and if they have 
nothing more than a general civic interest in enforcing the zoning ordi-
nance.6 
" Id. at 88 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
•• Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
" See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sees, 374 Mass. 76S, 373 N.E.2d 11S1 (1978) (Revere ordi-
nance held a violation of Massachusetts Constitution Art. 16 protecting free speech.) For a dis-
cussion of this case see Ortwein, Constitutional Law, 1978 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw§ 12.4. 
§ 11.3. I G.L. c. 40A, § 17. 
2 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 731, 418 N.E.2d 63S. This case is also discussed in§ 11.9, 
irifra. 
' Id. at 731, 418 N.E.2d at 637. 
• Id. 
' Id. at 732, 418 N.E.2d at 637. 
'Id. at 731, 418 N.E.2d at 637. 
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In Owens, an action was brought to annul a variance and special permit. 
The variance and special permit was granted to developer for the construc-
tion of a cluster development and conversion of a mansion into six condo-
minium units. 7 This development was to be constructed in an area zoned for 
single family units.• All but one of the plaintiffs were denied standing be-
cause they could not meet the requirements of more than a general civic in-
terest, and because they were not abutters or abutters of an abutter. 9 
The Appeals Court decided, in Redstone v. Board of Appeals of Chelms-
ford,10 that receipt of notice alone will not satisfy the standing require-
ments. In Redstone, the plaintiffs could not establish evidence of any tangi-
ble harm other than a resulting effect of business competition.'' Two banks 
were the opposing parties in this dispute. 12 Included with the defendant 
bank were the owners of the property in question and the Board of 
Appeals. 13 The contested permit allowed a side yard to be used as a parking 
lot for the defendant bank. 14 The plaintiff bank could show only that the 
side yard of the subject property, not visible from its ground floor, could be 
seen from the northernmost comer of its building.'' 
The Appeals Court in Redstone also noted that it is "hard to imagine 
what infringements of their legal rights the plaintiffs, who use their estates 
for business purposes, could conjure up from the varying of a by-law provi-
sion designed to protect persons who use their property for residential pur-
poses."" The court noted that chapter 40A differentiates between "persons 
aggrieved" as set out in section 17, and "parties in interest," as involved in 
section 11. 17 Thus, the court continued, a right to receive notice does not 
give rise to a standing to sue. 11 
Owens and Redstone followed the principles enunciated in Waltham 
Motor Inn, Inc. v. La Cava. 19 In La Cava, notice alone was sufficient to 
establish a presumption that a person was aggrieved 20 but evidence actually 
presented determined whether a person had standing when his standing was 
' /d. at 731,418 N.E.2d at 636. See§ 11.9 ififra for a discussion on the Cluster Zoning Issue. 
• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 732, 418 N.E.2d at 637. 
' Id. at 731, 418 N.E.2d at 637. 
10 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 351, 416 N.E.2d 543. 
" Id. at 353, 416 N.E.2d at 544. 
" Id. at 351-52, 416 N.E.2d at 543. 
" /d. at 351, 416 N.E.2d at 543. 
14 /d. 
" Id. at 352, 416 N.E.2d at 543. 
16 /d. at 353, 416 N.E.2d at 544. 
17 /d. 
II Id. 
" 3 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 326 N.E.2d 348 (1975). For an analysis ofthis case see Huber, Zon-
ing and Land Use, 1975 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 19.5. 
20 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 214, 326 N.E.2d at 352. 
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challenged. 21 Redstone and Owens maintain the principle that notice con-
fers a presumption of standing, while a challenge to standing will overcome 
that presumption. Additionally, Redstone rejects business competition as a 
ground for showing that the challenger is a person aggrieved. 
The line of cases, Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of 
Boston, 22 Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. La Cava and Redstone, indicate a 
trend that sets out a dual standard for determining if one is a person ag-
grieved. It will be much easier for a residential property owner to establish 
standing than an owner of property in a business district. Regarding resi-
dential areas, as long as property abuts or is nearby, and notice was received 
by the owner, the notice itself implies the possibility of some tangible harm. 
If a residential property owner is some distance away, of course, the pre-
sumption of harm is not present, and to establish standing one must assert 
more than a general civic interest in enforcement of the ordinance. 
When there is a question regarding a development or application for a 
special permit in a business district, standing is presumed until challenged. 
Once challenged the courts have stated, in dicta, that it would be difficult 
for a business to challenge the variance of a by-law because the by-laws 
essentially are for protection of residential property. 23 The Appeals Court 
cases go back to the principle enunciated in Circle Lounge and Grille, Inc. 
v. Board of Appeals of Boston. In Circle Lounge and Grille, the Supreme 
Judicial Court announced that a person aggrieved must suffer more than 
the general damages suffered by the public and more than a loss of the value 
of the person's business. 24 To satisfy the requirement for a person ag-
grieved, the landowner must allege that his land suffers damages which af-
fect the value of the land, rather than damage to the value of the business 
located on the land. 2 ' 
The question of whether loss of a business's value will satisfy the standing 
requirements of chapter 40A, section 17 appears to be settled. The cause for 
confusion was the Supreme Judicial Court's ruling in Shoppers' World, 
Inc, v. Beacon Terrace Realty, Inc. 26 In Shoppers' World, the Court found 
that a theater corporation had standing as an aggrieved party to challenge a 
special permit allowing the construction of two theaters in the same zoning 
district across the street from the plaintiff's business. 27 In Shoppers' World, 
21 Id. at 215, 326 N.E.2d at 352. 
22 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949). See D'Agostine and Huber, Land Use Planning 
Law, 1967 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 11.5, for a discussion of this case and issue. 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 353, 416 N.E.2d at 544. 
" 324 Mass. at 429, 86 N.E.2d at 922 (1949). See D'Agostine and Huber, Land Use Plan-
ning Law, 1967 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 11.5, at 202. 
" See D'Agostine and Huber, Land Use Planning Law, 1967 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAw§ 
11.5, at 202. 
26 353 Mass. 63, 228 N.E.2d 446 (1967). 
2
' Id. at 66, 228 N.E.2d at 448. 
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however, the defendants did not challenge the standing of the plaintiff on 
appeal. 21 Thus, Shoppers' World cannot be viewed as a holding that busi-
ness competition constitutes a ground for standing. The line of cases start-
ing with Circle Lounge clearly holds the contrary, if the standing issue is 
contested. 
§ 11.4. Zoning-Implying Permitted Use. During the Survey year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court was called upon to determine whether a medical 
clinic offering gynecological services, including abortions, constituted a 
permitted use under the zoning bylaw enacted by the town of Framingham. 
Permitted uses for this property included professional medical offices and 
hospitals, both private and public.• 
In Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Framing-
ham/ the clinic sought facilities suitable for ·operating a gynecological 
clinic. 3 The president of Framingham Clinic, interested in facilities in Fram-
ingham's business district, received a preliminary opinion from the town 
building commissioner that the proposed use was permitted as of right 
under provisions of the zoning bylaw. 4 Framingham comprehensively regu-
lates the use of land in the town, dividing the area into six classes of dis-
tricts. 5 The two districts involved in the controversy are the residence and 
business districts. The residence district allows professional offices within 
the residence of a physician in addition to allowing private and public hospi-
tals. The business district allows all uses permitted in the residence district 
as well as business and professional offices. With the exception of thirty-
nine stated uses all other uses are prohibited, unless authorized by the zon-
ing board of appeals. The facility was clearly within the Framingham busi-
ness district. 6 
After acquiring and leasing the land, the Clinic applied to the building 
commissioner for a building permit.' Prior to the Clinic's submission of 
final floor plans, the building commissioner withdrew his original opinion 
21 /d. at 66 n.1, 228 N.E.2d at 448 n.l. 
§ 11.4. ' Section III F of Framingham Zoning By-Law (cited in part at Framingham Clinic, 
Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Framingham, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 109, 115, 415 N.E.2d 
840, 844-45. 
2 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 109, 415 N.E.2d 840. 
' /d. at 110, 415 N.E.2d at 842. A prior Supreme Judicial Court decision, Framingham 
Clinic, Inc. v. Selectmen of Southborough, 373 Mass. 279, 367 N.E.2d 606 (1977) dealt with 
Framingham Clinic's attempt to open a similar clinic in Southborough. See Huber, Zoning and 
Land Use, 1978 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 11.4. 
• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 111, 415 N.E.2d at 843. 
' Id. at 115, 415 N.E.2d at 844. 
' Id. at 111, 415 N.E.2d at 842. 
' /d. at 112, 415 N.E.2d at 843. 
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that the Clinic constituted a permitted use under the zoning bylaw. 8 The 
commissioner notified the Framingham Board of Selectmen that the plain-
tiffs would be required to obtain a special permit from the zoning board of 
appeals before a building permit could issue. 9 The commissioner stated that 
the Clinic was not a professional office within the meaning of the bylaw and 
that the operation of the facility would not "protect and promote life," a 
stated purpose of the zoning bylaw. 10 
Pursuant to the zoning bylaw and General Laws, chapter 40A, sections 8 
and 15, the Clinic sought a reversal of the building commissioner's decision 
from the zoning board of appeals." The board affirmed the building com-
missioner's determination. 12 Pursuant to Section 17 of the Zoning Act, the 
Clinic appealed this decision to the superior court. 13 The superior court 
granted the Clinic's motion for summary judgment, holding that the opera-
tion of the Clinic was a permitted use under the Framingham bylaw and the 
zoning board of appeals had presented no genuine issue of material fact to 
defeat the motion. 14 The superior court ordered the issuance of a permit as 
of right to the Framingham Clinic without additional proceedings." The 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court. 16 
The board of appeals first noted that the Clinic was not a professional of-
fice, hospital or one of the expressly enumerated uses contained in the 
bylaw. Because the potential use was not one of the expressly enumerated 
uses contained in the bylaw, the Clinic was required to obtain a special per-
mit from the zoning board of appeals. 17 The Court regarded the resolution 
of this issue as a question of law because the bylaw does not define the terms 
"professional office" of "hospital." 18 The Court evaluated the terms 
under ordinary principles of statutory construction, deriving the usual and 
accepted meaning of the terms from sources presumably known to the enac-
tors of the bylaws. 19 The omission of the word "clinic" in the Framingham 
zoning bylaw was not determinative of the issue. The Court examined the 
definition of "clinic" and "professional" as found in the dictionary, the 
General Laws and other relevant legal authorities, and held the gynecolog-
• /d. at 112-13, 415 N.E.2d at 843 . 
• /d. 
•• Id. at 113, 415 N.E.2d at 844. 
" Id. at 114, 415 N.E.2d at 844. 
12 /d. 
" /d. 
•• Id. 
" /d. at 114-15, 415 N.E.2d at 844. 
" /d. at 116, 415 N.E.2d at 845. 
17 /d. 
II /d. 
" /d. 
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ical clinic to be a professional office and a permitted use under the zoning 
bylaw. 20 
Even though the bylaw authorized only two assisting personnel for physi-
cian's offices located in a residence district, this limitation did not indicate 
that a similar restriction would be imposed in the business district. The 
Court stated that "absent some express limitation, the right to employ per-
sonnel and facilities reasonably necessary to a particular professional use is 
implicit in the authorization to establish a professional office." 21 The Court 
interpreted the statute to allow greater latitude in employing assisting per-
sonnel because the business district was a less restrictively zoned area. 
Of greater importance for the Court were the bylaw provisions allowing 
hospitals and professional offices in the business district. Although the 
Court interpreted the term "professional offices" to include the Clinic, the 
fact that hospitals were also permitted uses according to the bylaw indicated 
that Framingham had established a spectrum of permitted uses for the busi-
ness district. The Court stated, "When a municipality allows as of right, 
uses which lie at both ends of the spectrum in terms of a particular category 
of uses-less importance need be attached to fixing where on that spectrum 
a specific use lies." 22 The Court was not persuaded that the proposed clinic 
would have an impact on the community differing significantly from the 
currently permitted uses. 
The Court also affirmed the superior court's order, requiring the issuance 
of the building permit rather than remanding the case for further proceed-
ings. 23 When the applicant for a building permit satisfies the burden of 
establishing that a permit should issue as a matter of right, the superior 
court must order the issuance of the permit. 
For local zoning boards, the decision indicates that although a zoning 
bylaw contains certain specific permitted uses, other unexpressed, yet per-
mitted, uses do exist. The Court did find that Framingham had established 
a series of uses in enacting the bylaw, and that uses other than those specif-
ically permitted uses were also permitted. The Court did not suggest, how-
ever, that a use within this spectrum could not be prohibited expressly by a 
bylaw amendment. 
zo 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 117-18, 41S N.E.2d at 84S-46. The Court relied on WEBSTER's 
NEw INT'L DICfiONARY at S03 and 197S-76 (2d ed. 19S9), G.L. c. 111, § S2, the cases of People 
v. Dobbs Ferry Medical Pavilion, Inc., 33 N.Y.2d S84, S8S, affirming 40 App. Div.2d 324 
(N.Y. 1973) and U.S. v. Laws, 163 U.S. 2S8, 266 (1896), and R. ANDERSON, AMERICANLAWOF 
ZoNING§ 16.11 at 69 (2d ed. 1977). 
21 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 119, 41S N.E.2d at 846-47. 
22 Id. at 119-20, 41S N.E.2d at 847. 
23 /d. at 122, 41S N.E.2d at 848. 
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§ 11.5. Zoning-Frontage Requirements. Minimum lot size and mini-
mum frontage requirements are basic tools of zoning for controlling popu-
lation density. 1 Minimum frontage provisions generally require that each lot 
be provided with specific access or have a specific amount of frontage on a 
public way. z A community operating under a valid zoning bylaw may in-
clude minimum frontage as a part of its comprehensive plan, but this does 
not preclude a challenge to the provisions. A landowner still may show that 
the minimum frontage provision may not be applied lawfully to his prop-
erty. 3 Judicial review of these bylaw provisions requires a balancing of the 
public benefit and the loss of private property rights. 
During the Surv(!y year, the Appeals Court examined the validity of the 
Town of Avon's zoning bylaw that required a minimum frontage of two 
hundred feet for a lot in a residential district used for multiple dwelling 
units. In MacNeil v. Town of Avon4 the court held that the public gain from 
the application of the frontage requirement was slight, while the harm to the 
plaintiff's property was great. Thus, the court invalidated the bylaw as it 
applied to the specific property. 5 The Appeals Court also disapproved of 
the land court's reasoning that the same factors should be examined to sup-
port the validity of minimum frontage and minimum lot size. 6 
The plaintiff required a special permit to build multiple units in the 
town's residential district. 7 In order to obtain a special permit, the parcel of 
land needed a 200 foot frontage. Moreover, the parcel had to meet the 
minimum acreage requirement of 40,000 square feet. The lot size require-
ment was satisfied while the lot's frontage was only 190 feet. 8 
The Appeals Court determined that Barney & Carey Co. v. Town of Mil-
ton9 was controlling. 10 The court emphasized that the imposition of the 
zoning requirement must have a real or substantial relation to the public 
health, public safety or public welfare." The court held that the 190 foot 
§ ll.S. 1 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING§§ 9.60-.61 (2d ed. 1977). 
' /d. at § 9.61. 
' See Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1960 ANN. SURV. MASs. LAW§ 13.13; Barney & Carey 
Co. v. Town of Milton, 324 Mass. 440, 44S, 87 N.E.2d 9 (1949). 
• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1287, 422 N.E.2d 479. 
' /d. at 1291, 422 N.E.2d at 481. 
• /d. at 1288 n.l, 422 N .E.2d at 480 n.l (citing Dolan v. Board of Appeals of Chatham, 3S9 
Mass. 699, 700-01, 270 N.E.2d 917, 918-19 (1971); Howland v. Acting Superintendent ofBidgs 
& Inspector of Bldgs of Cambridge, 328 Mass. ISS, IS9-60, 102 N.E.2d 423, 42S-26 (19Sl); 
Spalke v. Board of Appeals of Plymouth, 7 Mass. App. a. 683, 389 N.E.2d 788 (1979)). 
' /d. at 1287-88, 422 N.E.2d at 479. 
I /d. 
' 324 Mass. 440, 87 N.E.2d 9 (1949). 
•• 1981 Mass. App. a. Adv. Sh. at 1288, 422 N.E.2d at 479. 
" Id. at 1289, 422 N.E.2d at 480. 
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frontage was sufficient to provide for the safety and access of the lot. 12 The 
200 foot frontage requirement was found to have no rational relationship to 
any of the purposes which would justify the requirement. 13 
The Appeals Court, in an effort to provide guidance to local planning 
authorities, endorsed a balancing test for determining the validity of these 
types of zoning restrictions. 14 As stated in Jenckes v. Building Commission-
er of Brookline, 1' the test is whether "[t]he injury to the owner of the isolat-
ed lot is so harsh and substantial in comparison with the trivial public bene-
fit, if any, from application of the amendment to the lot, as to make that 
application confiscatory and an invalid taking of the owner's property not 
justified by the police power. " 16 
§ 11.6. Zoning-Constructive Approval of Special Permit. During the 
1981 Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed an interpretation of 
Massachusetts zoning law regarding special permits. In Building Inspector 
of Attleboro v. Attleboro Landfill, Inc. ,t the Court held that a zoning 
board's final action on a special permit application occurs when the deci-
sion of the board is flled with the town clerk. 2 The date of final action is im-
portant in special permit cases because, "failure by a special permit grant-
ing authority to take final action upon an application for a special permit 
within said ninety days following the date of a. public hearing shall be 
deemed to be a grant of the permit applied for.'' 3 The opinion of the Court 
emphasizes that in some situations compliance with the exact form of a stat-
ute is necessary if rights are to be determined with finality. 
In Attleboro Land Fill, the defendant appealed from a permanent injunc-
tion that prohibited him from continuing the operation of his sanitary land-
fill in the town of Attleboro. 4 The building inspector sought equitable relief, 
alleging that the defendant was operating without a special permit in viola-
tion of Attleboro's zoning ordinance.' The landfill operator's defense was 
that the board had constructively granted the special permit. 6 In fact, the 
board of appeals had voted to deny the application for the special permit 
within ninety days of the public hearing on the permit, but had failed to me 
its decision with the town clerk until after the ninety day period. 7 A resolu-
12 Jd. at 1290-91, 422 N.E.2d at 481. 
" Jd. at 1291, 422 N.E.2d at 481. 
" Id. 
" 341 Mass. 162, 167 N.E.2d at 757 (1960). 
16 Jd. at 166, 167 N.E.2d at 760. 
§ 11.6. ' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1653, 423 N.E.2d 1009. 
' Id. at 1656, 423 N.E.2d at lOll. 
' G.L. c. 40A, § 9. 
• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1653, 423 N.E.2d at 1010. 
' Jd. 
• Jd. at 1654, 423 N.E.2d at 1010. 
' Id. 
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tion of when final action under General Laws chapter 40A section 9 oc-
curred disposed of the controversy. 
The Court's decision was based on three considerations. First, a reading 
of chapter 40A in its entirety strongly implies a duty of the board of appeals 
to file its decision with the city clerk. 8 Second, the appeals period would 
become indeterminate in duration without a filing of the board's decision 
because the appeals period commences with the filing of the decision with 
the clerk. 9 Such an unlimited appeals period would be contrary to appellate 
practice and legislative mandate. 10 The final, and perhaps most important, 
factor for the Court was its previous decision in Selectmen of Pembroke v. 
R & P Realty Corp." In that case, the Court held that final action of a plan-
ning board in approving a subdivision control plan occurred upon the 
board's filing its decision with the city clerk.' 2 Thus, the Court reversed the 
decision of the superior court and concluded that the city of Attleboro had 
constructively granted the special permit. 13 
§ 11.7. Variances-Requirement of Detailed Record by Zoning Board of 
Appeals-Removal of Conditions on Variance. During the Survey year, 
the Massachusetts courts considered two significant cases involving vari-
ances. A zoning variance is a form of administrative relief designed to func-
tion as an "escape hatch" from the literal application of zoning bylaws that 
would deny a landowner all beneficial use of his property.' A court review-
ing a zoning board of appeal decision to grant such relief must proceed with 
caution, keeping in mind the concerns of landowners in the community who 
have chosen to obey the zoning bylaws although the return on their property 
also may have been diminished. 2 
In Warren v. Board of Appeals of Amherst, 3 the Supreme Judicial Court 
examined the Amherst board of appeals' decision to grant the defendant a 
variance from the minimum frontage requirement of the Amherst bylaw. 
The bylaw required that lots in the single family residential district maintain 
a minimum frontage of one hundred feet. 4 The property of the defendant 
previously was part of a larger parcel which, as a whole, satisfied the re-
' Id. at 1655, 423 N.E.2d at 1011. 
' Id. at 1655-56, 423 N.E.2d at 1011. 
10 Id. (citing Mass. R.A.P. 4, G.L. c. 41, § 80). 
11 348 Mass. 120, 202 N.E.2d 409 (1964). 
12 Jd. at 127, 202 N.E.2d at 413. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1658, 423 N.E.2d at 1012. 
§ 11.7. ' See generally 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAw OF ZoNING§ 18.01 et seq. (2d ed. 
1977). Of course, the express condition for the grant of a permit needs to be met. 
2 See generally 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW 01' ZoNING § 18.42 et seq. (2d ed. 1977). 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 522, 416 N.E.2d 1382. 
• Id. at 524, 416 N.E.2d at 1384. 
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quirement.' In anticipation of selling the lot as the site for a single family 
dwelling, the defendant sought a variance. 6 The frontage of the lot was two 
feet short of the required one-hundred feet. 7 
The zoning board of appeals granted the variance stating three reasons. 8 
First, the lot's use for a single family dwelling clearly was the only appropri-
ate use for the land and the denial of this use would render the land useless. 9 
Second, severance of the lot from the larger conforming lot created peculiar 
conditions. 10 Third, the intent of the bylaw would· be upheld and public 
good maintained by granting the variance. 11 
The variance was challenged by the plaintiff, owner of the adjoining 
property, in an appeal to the superior court. 12 The superior court referred 
the matter to a master who affirmed the zoning board's granting of the vari-
ance. The superior court affirmed the decision of the master. 13 The Appeals 
Court summarily reversed the superior court, ordering the variance an-
nulled on the grounds that the zoning board exceeded its authority. 14 
The Supreme Judicial Court examined two issues in affirming the deci-
sion of the Appeals Court. The first issue concerned the application of the 
grandfather clause exemption allowed pursuant to chapter 40A, section 6 of 
the General Laws. The Court refused to consider this issue owing to the in-
adequacy of the record before it: the text of the zoning bylaw was not part 
of the lower court record and a zoning bylaw is not an appropriate subject 
for judicial notice. 1' The Court also refused to consider the grandfather 
clause exemption because the possibility of the exemption was never raised 
before the board of appeals, the required starting point for such an exemp-
tion.16 The Court's refusal to decide the grandfather clause issue was based 
upon the premise that the use is permitted as of right using a grandfather 
clause analysis, thus consideration by a reviewing court is appropriate onfy 
after the proper presentation and decision by the local board of zoning ap-
peals.17 
The second issue involved the validity of the variance granted by the 
board. The Court stated that a zoning board's granting of a valid variance 
' /d. at 532, 416 N.E.2d at 1388. 
• /d. at 524, 416 N.E.2d at 1384. 
7 Id. 
• /d. at 524-25, 416 N.E.2d at 1384-85. 
• /d. at 525, 416 N.E.2d at 1385. 
10 /d. 
II /d. 
" /d. at 526, 416 N.E.2d at 1385. 
" /d. 
14 /d. 
" /d. at 529, 416 N.E.2d at 1386-87. 
" /d. at 529, 416 N.E.2d at 1387. 
17 /d. at 530, 416 N.E.2d at 1388. 
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requires a detailed record of the board's proceedings and a decision stating 
the reasons supporting the decision, not merely a recital of the statutory 
conditions essential to the granting of a variance. 11 In the present case, the 
board described the size, shape, and topography of the lot as required by 
the statute, but failed to explain adequately the effect of the variance on the 
zoning district." The mere fact that the only deficiency connected with the 
lot concerned the frontage requirement is not enough to uphold the vari-
ance. The creation of the subject lot from a conforming parcel of land does 
not, in itself, create a substantial hardship of the kind that would permit a 
valid variance. Thus, challenged variances will be sustained only if the 
reviewing court finds that the zoning board has provided a detailed record 
of the procedures followed and factors considered by the local board in 
granting a variance. 
The second case, Huntington v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Hadley, 20 
involved a determination of the proper procedure for removing a condition 
from a zoning variance. In Huntington, the plaintiff, an abutting land-
owner to the subject property, sought judicial review of a town of Hadley 
zoning board of appeals decision granting the removal of a condition from 
an existing zoning variance. 21 The defendant, owner of the subject prop-
erty, operated a precast concrete manufacturing business. 22 This use was 
prohibited under the Hadley zoning bylaw but the defendant was allowed to 
continue operating his business as a nonconforming use existing prior to the 
adoption of the town's zoning bylaws. 23 
In 1973, the defendant petitioned the board of appeals for a variance 
from the zoning bylaw because he was concerned that the expansion of his 
business operations had exceeded the nonconforming use exemption. 24 The 
board granted the variance subject to several conditions. The conditions 
restricted the term of the variance to the life of the defendant, and pro-
hibited any transfer of the variance to another party. 25 The validity of the 
1973 variance was not challenged by any parties to this action. 
The defendant petitioned the board in 1976 for a removal of the restric-
tions on the duration and transferability of the variance. 26 The board 
removed the condition, citing the substantial hardship on the defendant's 
estate upon his death when the enforcement of the condition would render 
" /d. at 531, 416 N.E.2d at 1388. 
" /d. at 532, 416 N.E.2d at 1388. 
20 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1975, 428 N.E.2d 826. 
21 /d. at 1975, 428 N.E.2d at 827. 
" /d. at 1975-76, 428 N.E.2d at 827. 
" /d. at 1976, 428 N.E.2d at 827. 
24 /d. 
" /d. 
26 /d. 
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the specialized manufacturing operation useless, causing a period of uncer-
tainty and lost income for the defendant's family. 27 The board concluded 
that the removal of the condition would cause no detriment to the public 
and approved the removal. 21 
The plaintiff, as an abutting landowner, brought an action against the 
board of appeals and the defendant alleging that the board had exceeded its 
authority in allowing the modification of the 1973 variance. 29 The plaintiff 
claimed that the board's action represented the grant of a new variance and 
the statutory requirements for a new variance had not been satisfied. 30 The 
trial court, however, found the statutory requirements for a variance were 
satisfied and that, as a practical matter, the board's action represented a 
modification of the variance rather than a new grant. 31 
Reviewing the decision of the trial court, the Appeals Court found it un-
necessary to evaluate the controversy in terms of whether the board of ap-
peals had granted a modification of an existing variance or the granting of a 
new variance. The court "analyzed [the board's action] in terms of the 
nature and effect of the condition itself and in light of the statutory con-
cerns relevant to the grant of a variance." 32 The court emphasized that the 
applicable section of the Zoning Act allows variances based on circumstanc-
es relating to the "soil conditions, shape, or topography" of the land or 
structures and not upon circumstances resulting in personal hardships to the 
landowner. 33 A zoning variance applies to the land only and not to the 
land's current owner. The court held that the condition imposed by the 1973 
variance was essentially personal, so its removal would be scrutinized to 
determine whether the board had abused its discretion. 34 
The court held the removal was within the discretionary power of the 
board. 35 The record before the Court did not indicate any legitimate expec-
tation interests of the plaintiff which were ignored by the board of 
appeals. 36 The Court concluded that the "removal of the condition is in 
conformity with the goal that the zoning board law be applied to further, 
rather than hinder, the stabilization of land use." 37 
The Appeals Court correctly decided to refuse to categorize the board's 
action as either a modification of an existing variance or the granting of a 
" /d. at 1977, 428 N.E.2d at 827-28. 
" Id. at 1977, 428 N.E.2d at 828. 
" Id. at 1978, 428 N.E.2d at 828. 
,. ld. 
" ld. 
" ld. at 1979-80, 428 N.E.2d at 824. 
" ld. 
,. ld. at 1984, 428 N.E.2d at 831. 
" ld. at 1984-85, 428 N.E.2d at 832. 
" ld. at 1985, 428 N.E.2d at 832. 
" ld. at 1986, 428 N.E.2d at 832. 
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new variance. The Court's reasoning emphasizes that the crucial aspect for 
this type of inquiry is not in determining the type of administrative act per-
formed by the board of appeals, but rather is an analysis of the substance of 
the variance term which the parties seek to alter. 
§ 11.8. Variances and Special Permits-Requirements for Reconsidera-
tion. Section 16 of the new Zoning Act1 contains a major revision of the 
provisions concerning reconsideration of an application for a variance or 
special permit that has been acted upon unfavorably. Under its counterpart, 
§ 20 in the former Zoning Enabling Act, 2 a matter that has been decided un-
favorably could not be reconsidered by the board of appeals within two 
years from the date of the decision, except when reconsideration was con-
sented to by all but one of the members of the planning board. Under the 
more demanding provisions of the new act, there is an additional require-
ment that the permit-granting authority must make a finding of "specific 
and material changes in the conditions upon which the previous unfavor-
able action 'was based" 3 before such reconsideration can take place. 
In Ranney v. Board of Appeals of Nantucket,• the Appeals Court ad-
dressed for the first time the question of what constitutes a sufficiently re-
vised application to justify second review within the two-year moratorium 
period. 
On March 28, 1978, an application was made to the board of appeals of 
Nantucket for a special permit to build an addition to a motel. 5 The board 
denied the request, and the applicant brought an action to annul the board's 
decision and order it to issue a permit. 6 In addition to appealing this deci-
sion, the applicant filed an altered application with the board of appeals on 
June 7, 1978.7 On June 26, in compliance with the requirements of chapter 
§ 11.8. ' G.L. c. 40A, § 16, as appearing in St. 1975, c. 808, § 3. 
2 G.L. c. 40A, § 20. 
• G.L. c. 40A, § 16, as appearing in St. 1975, c. 808, § 3, reads, in part: "No appeal, appli-
cation or petition which has been unfavorably and fmally acted upon by the special permit 
granting or permit granting authority shall be acted favorably upon within two years after the 
date of fmal unfavorable action unless said special permit granting authority or permit grant-
ing authority fmds, by a unanimous vote of a board of three members or by a vote of four 
members of a board of five members or two-thirds vote of a board of more than five members, 
specific and material changes in the conditions upon which the previous unfavorable action 
was based, and describes such changes in the record of its proceedings, arid unless all but one 
of the members of the planning board consents thereto and after notice is given to the parties in 
interest of the time and place of the proceedings when the question of such consent will be con-
sidered." 
• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 12, 414 N.E.2d 373. 
' /d. at 13, 414 N.E.2d at 374 . 
• /d. 
'Id. 
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40A, section 16, • the board of appeals approved, after unanimous consent 
by the planning board, reconsideration of the application and made a deter-
mination that the second application contained specific and material 
changes. 9 A month later, on July 27, the board of appeals granted the 
special permit. 10 A group of neighbors appealed this action, claiming that 
the grant of the permit was beyond the board's authority. 11 
The Appeals Court quickly rejected the neighbors' claim that the board 
had failed to give notice to interested parties of the proceedings at which it 
considered allowing the second application. 12 Not only did the record of the 
trial court contain evidence that the notice requirements of section 1613 were 
met through mail and publication, but the neighbors were in attendance and 
well-prepared at the meeting, negating any claim of prejudice even if notice 
had been deficient. 14 
As a backdrop to its discussion of what constitutes "specific and material 
changes," the court set forth the countervailing policy considerations 
underlying statutory provisions such as section 16. These provisions serve to 
ensure the finality of administrative decisions, thereby protecting parties 
from repeatedly having to contest the same issues, while also granting the 
local board some flexibility to reconsider a request when conditions have 
changed. 1' The court also emphasized that it is principally a function of the 
local board to determine whether the conditions have changed sufficiently 
and that such decisions, including the board's discretionary power to give 
weight to "differences which in an absolute sense are relatively minor," 16 
should be given deference by the reviewing court. 17 
Since an application for a project that is materially different from an 
earlier one has never been considered a reapplication or come under tpe 
restrictions of section 16 or its predecessor in the Zoning Enabling Act, the 
court reasoned that the changes governed by section 16 must necessarily in-
volve something less than radical differences. 11 It then addressed those 
changes cited by the board: 
1. revision of the outdoor lighting plan so that all lights were flush with the 
ceiling and elimination of direct lights or fixtures which might be visible in 
any direction from an elevation twenty feet above the level of the parking 
area; 
• See note 3, supra. 
' 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 13, 414 N.E.2d at 375. 
lo Id. 
" Id. at 13-14, 414 N.E.2d at 375. 
12 Id. at 14, 414 N.E.2d at 375. 
" See note 3, supra. 
14 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 14-15, 414 N.E.2d at 375. 
" Id. at 15, 414 N.E.2d at 375-76. 
" /d. at 16, 414 N.E.2d at 376. 
17 /d. 
11 Id. at 16-17, 414 N.E.2d at 376. 
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2. installation of blackout drapes in the windows of the proposed addition; 
3. installation of sound insulating materials in the exterior walls of the pro-
posed addition so as to suppress noise; 
4. landscaping of parking area along its westerly boundary with an eight foot 
privet hedge. u 
Each responded to a specific ground of refusal by the board on the initial 
application. 20 The court noted that although each change, taken separately, 
had a "cosmetic quality," the total result was a less obtrusive building, a 
clear response to the board's earlier objections. 21 The court also accepted as 
a valid change of condition the board's determination that it had erred in its 
conclusion on the first application that the proposed addition would 
adversely affect traffic on the street and the value of residential proper-
ties. 22 In doing so, the court rejected the neighbors' contention that a hear-
ing on a second application should be limited to the evidence received at the 
hearing on the first. The trial court's findings that the reapplication con-
tained "significant and substantial" revisions were thus affirmed. 23 
The court also addressed another objection by the neighbors regarding a 
deferred decision on the roof color that was brought in a third action. 24 A 
condition of the special permit granted by the board had been the require-
ment that the roof have suitable covering such as shingles and that the color 
of the covering be approved by the city's Historic Districts Commission and 
the board of appeals. 25 Final approval for the color was given in April of 
1979, nine months after the initial granting of the permit. 26 
The neighbors argued that the conditional language in the grant of a 
special permit required a further determination before the permit could 
issue, thereby rendering the board's decision invalid. 27 The court rejected 
this argument and concluded that the board had made a valid present grant 
of the permit, simply reserving to itself review of compliance with the condi-
tions. 28 Furthermore, the criteria for judgment and the color choices were 
already before the board and had been discussed at the public hearing 
preceding the grant of the permit. 29 The court therefore affirmed the trial 
court's finding that res judicata barred this action. 
" /d. at 17, 414 N.E.2d at 376. 
20 /d. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. 
" /d. at 18, 414 N.E.2d at 377. 
,. /d. 
" /d. 
" /d. 
27 /d. 
21 /d. 
" /d. at 19, 414 N.E.2d at 377. 
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This decision provides the first guidance as to what the court will accept 
as "material and significant change" sufficient to justify reapplication 
within the two-year moratorium period of chapter 40A, section 16. It is 
clear that the change need not be so drastic that it amounts to a change in 
the project. Changes that address specific objections that were grounds for 
the first denial of the application would be considered material, particularly 
if they contribute to an overall lessening of the project's objectionable im-
pact. Additionally, the board of appeals is not bound to accept the assump-
tions upon which it based its earlier unfavorable action if it finds that they 
resulted from erroneous information. Although the additional requirement 
of section 16 makes the process of obtaining reconsideration of an applica-
tion more difficult, this provision of the new Zoning Act, as interpreted by 
the court, seems to reflect the desired goals of administrative finality and 
flexibility when the situation warrants it. 
§ 11.9. Subdivision Control-Ouster Zoning. The case of Owens v. 
Board of Appeals of Belmont1 addressed the issues of cluster zoning2 and 
§ 11.9. ' 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 731,418 N.E.2d 635. This case is also discussed in§ 
11.3 supra, on the issue of Person Aggrieved. 
' G.L. c. 40A, § 2 specifies the provisions that are to be included in a special permit for clus-
ter development: 
Special permits authorizing cluster development shall provide that open land for clus-
ter development shall be conveyed to the city or town and accepted by it for park or 
open space use, or be conveyed to a nonprofit organization, the principal purpose of 
which is the conservation of open space, or be conveyed to a corporation or trust owned 
or to be owned by the owners of lots or residential units within the land. 
G.L. c. 40A, § 9 specifies additional provisions, and definitions relating to cluster zoning: 
Zoning ordinances or by-laws shall provide for specific types of uses which shall only 
be permitted in specified districts upon the issuance of a special permit. Special permits 
may be issued only for uses which are in harmony with the general purpose and intent of 
the ordinance or by-law, and shall be subject to general or specific provisions set forth 
therein; and such permits may also impose conditions, safeguards and limitations on 
time or use. 
Zoning ordinances or by-laws may also provide for special permits authorizing in-
creases in the permissible density of population or intensity of a particular use in a pro-
posed development; provided that the petitioner or applicant shall, as a condition for 
the grant of said permit, provide certain open space, housing for persons of low or 
moderate income, traffic or pedestrian improvements, or other amenities. Such zoning 
ordinances or by-laws shall state the specific improvements or amenities or locations of 
proposed uses for which the special permits shall be granted, and the maximum in-
creases in density of population or intensity of use which may be authorized by such 
special permits. 
Zoning ordinances or by-laws may provide that special permits may be granted for 
multi-family residential use in nonresidentially zoned areas where the public good 
would be served and after a fmding by the special permit granting authority, that such 
nonresidentially zoned area would not be adversely affected by such a residential use, 
26
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standing. 3 The Board of Appeals had authorized the construction of a 
multi~family cluster development in an area zoned for single family resi-
dences. 4 The plaintiff contended that the special permit issued by the Board 
was invalid because "the ordinance which allows the construction of multi-
family developments conflicts with and is overridden by the general use pro-
visions which call for single family residence in this zone."' The ordinance 
as amended allows "for any tract of land in a single residence district to be 
developed as a cluster development." 6 
The Appeals Court noted that the plaintiff's reading of the ordinance 
essentially limits the Board of Appeals to granting permits for projects con-
sisting only of single-family residences clustered together. 7 The court stated 
that such an interpretation "would render the [cluster zoning] amendment 
largely superfluous and effectively nullify the purpose for which it was 
enacted." • The Appeals Court allowed the permits to stand. 9 
The purpose of cluster zoning is to maintain the same population density 
as if the regular zoning ordinance were followed, except that individual 
private open areas are decreased and pooled or common open areas are in-
and that permitted uses in such a zone are not noxious to a multi-family use. 
Zoning ordinances or by-laws may also provide that cluster developments or planned 
unit developments shall be permitted upon the issuance of a special permit. 
"Ouster development" means a residential development in which the buildings and 
accessory uses are clustered together into one or more groups separated from adjacent 
property and other groups within the development by intervening open land. A cluster 
development shall be permitted only on a plot of land of such minimum size as a zoning 
ordinance or by-law may specify which is divided into building lots with dimensional 
control, density and use restrictions of such building lots varying from those otherwise 
permitted by the ordinance or by-law and open land. Such open land when added to the 
building lots shall be at least equal in area to the land area required by the ordinance or 
by-law for the total number of units or buildings contemplated in the development. 
Such open land shall either be conveyed to the city or town and accepted by it for park 
or open space use, or be conveyed to a non-profit organization the principal purpose of 
which is the conservation of open space, or to be conveyed to a corporation or trust 
owned or to be owned by the owners of lots or residential units within the plot. If such a 
corporation or trust is utilized, ownership thereof shall pass with conveyances of the 
lots or residential units. In any case where such land is not conveyed to the city or town, 
a restriction enforceable by the city or town shall be recorded providing that such land 
shall be kept in an open or natural state and not be built for residential use or developed 
for accessory uses such as parking or roadway. 
' See§ 11.3 supra for a discussion of the standing issue. 
• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 732, 418 N.E.2d at 636. 
' Id. at 732, 418 N.E.2d at 637. 
• Id. The Ouster Development Amendment to the Belmont ordinance was enacted pursuant 
to the authority conferred by c; 40A, §§ 2 and 9. /d. 
'/d. 
I /d. 
• /d. at 733, 418 N.E.2d at 638. 
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creased. 10 The common open areas can be secured by their conveyance to 
the municipality or through joint ownership by all the residents in the devel-
opment with attached covenants. Joint ownership is contingent upon 
ownership of a parcel in the development. When common open areas are 
given to the municipality, they usually are converted to parks, recreation 
areas, sites for school buildings, fire stations or the like. If the common 
areas are owned jointly, the area set aside usually is green or recreation 
areas for the exclusive use of those in the development. Cluster zoning, as 
an alternative to large lot zoning, is used by many municipalities to control 
density. 11 
In Owens, the plaintiff also asserted that the permit granted to the real 
estate developer should be invalidated because the Cluster Zoning Amend-
ment to the zoning bylaw fails to provide adequate standards to guide deci-
sion making by the Board of Appeals. 12 The Appeals Court disagreed, 
citing the Cluster Zoning Amendment as having "prerequisites which are 
more stringent than those mandated by the Zoning Enabling Act.'' 13 The 
amendment included strict regulations regarding dimensions, the number of 
dwelling units, and requirements for open space. 14 In essence, the Appeals 
Court found that the Board of Appeals had adequate guidance in decision 
making, and thus upheld the permit. 1' 
The use of cluster zoning involves advantages and disadvantages. The 
better sites may be used for building, while hilly or marshy sections can be 
set aside for open areas. A developer also will not have to invest as much for 
paved streets, sidewalks, utilities, and other services, because the houses are 
not spread out. One of the disadvantages may be that a developer must 
comply with the cluster zoning regulations. Usually such a development will 
receive extensive review and require careful supervision by the Planning 
Board. 16 
A problem for the residents of a cluster development concerns the proper 
use and maintenance of common open areas. Covenants to promote the 
maintenance and proper use of the common areas may be too restrictive and 
others not restrictive enough. In the case of Byrne v. Perry, 17 the defendant 
had incorporated a portion of restricted land, owned in trust, to form a 
10 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW§ 47.01. 
" See Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 763 (1970). See also 2 N. 
WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW§ 47.03. 
12 Owen v. Board of Appeals of Belmont, 1981 Mass. App. a. Adv. Sh. at 732,418 N.E.2d 
at 638. 
" Id. at 733, 418 N.E.2d at 638. 
14 Id. 
" Id. 
16 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW§ 47.01. 
11 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1202, 421 N.E.2d 1248. 
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buildable. lot conforming to the local zoning ordinance. The area known as 
the "Green Belt" was to stay open in its natural state. 11 No structures were 
to be built upon the land. Provisions were made for a dirt driveway to re-
main and wells, septic systems, and underground utilities to be installed 
provided the "Green Belt" be restored to its natural condition. The Appeals 
Court found that the defendant was not in violation of this agreement be-
cause the dwelling to be built was to be entirely on the unrestricted area of 
the lot!' The court noted that the agreement prohibited construction or 
physical alteration except as allowed, but did not prohibit such abstract uses 
as the inclusion of "Green Belt" space into a lot to satisfy zoning by-law re-
quirements. 20 
Although the open area in Byrne v. Perry was not an open area in a clus-
ter development, one can see how the open areas in a cluster development 
could be analogized to the "Green Belt." The problem with giving up a 
private open area to acquire greater use of public open areas is that the loss 
of control and foreseeability of possible use can be troublesome. The con-
struction of a trust to manage the land should include exclusive power to 
regulate the uses, both concrete and abstract. Provisions must be estab-
lished for entering and leaving the association or the trust. Provisions 
should be included for maintenance of the land either through an annual 
assessment or user fees. With these considerations and others, a major 
problem arises. The responsibility for establishing the trust or association 
for the open area rests with the developer if he will sell the lots. The conse-
quences of the actions allowed by the trust or association, however, do not 
affect the developer. Thus, the developer has no incentive to consider the 
long range consequences except those the developer foresees as affecting the 
immediate sales prospects. Thus, the permit granting authority must 
evaluate carefully a developer's request for a special cluster zoning permit. 
§ 11.10. Subdivision Control-Adequacy of adjoining public ways. A 
stated purpose of the Subdivision Control Law is to empower the Planning 
Board to enforce the law "with due regard for the provision of adequate ac-
cess to all of the lots in a subdivision by ways that will be safe and conve-
nient for travel; for lessening congestion in such ways and in the adjacent 
public ways."' In North Landers Corp. v. Planning Board of Falmouth, 2 
the issue was whether the Board could deny approval of a subdivision plan 
" Id. at 1202, 421 N.E.2d at 1249. 
19 ld. 
,. Id. 
§ 11.10. I G.L. c. 41, § 81M. 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 264, 416 N.E.2d 934. 
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for the reason that the public way leading to the subdivision was inadequate 
to handle the estimated traffic increase created by the subdivision. The 
Court also addressed the question of whether the words "adequate access, 
provide a definite standard for real estate developers. 
In North Landers, the plaintiff flled a preliminary plan for a subdivi-
sion. 3 Before the plaintiff received approval of that plan, a definitive plan 
was submitted for approval. 4 The definitive plan, like the preliminary plan, 
was not approved.' The board cited inadequate access of the subdivision 
roads to a public way, the inadequacy of a certain public way, and other 
reasons. 6 
The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the position of North 
Landers and held that a planning board may consider the adequacy of pub-
lic ways outside the subdivision when reviewing a proposed subdivision. 7 
The Court found that the statute, section 81M of chapter 41, clearly states 
that a planning board's duty is to lessen congestion in adjacent public ways, 
and coordinate the ways in the subdivision with the public ways. • The Court 
also cited numerous cases in other jurisdictions with subdivision laws simi-
lar to chapter 41 section 81M, which agree that the condition of adjacent 
public ways must be considered. 9 
The Court next addressed North Landers' contention that the Falmouth 
regulation requiring adequate access is vague, failing to give notice of what 
is required of prospective developers. The test for impermissible vagueness 
in a regulation was announced in Castle Estates, Inc. v. Park & Planning 
Board of Medfield. 10 All subdivision regulations must be "comprehensive, 
reasonably definite, and carefully drafted, so that owners may know in ad-
vance what is required of them., 11 
The Court, in determining whether this standard was met, first analyzed 
the phrase "adequate access, to determine if it constituted an indefinite 
term. The Court's reading of the regulation found the denotation of "ade-
quate access" a vague term of judgment and degree. 12 The Court stated, 
' Id. at 265, 416 N.E.2d at 936. 
• Id. 
' Id . 
• Id. 
' Id. at 268, 416 N.E.2d at 938. 
• Id. at 269, 416 N.E.2d at 938. 
• Id. at 270, 416 N.E.2d at 938 (citing Buena Park v. Boyar, 186 Cal. App.2d 61 (1960); 
Nicoli v. Planning & Zoning Commission of Easton, 171 Conn. 89,96 (1976); Arrowhead Dev. 
Co. v. Livingston County Rd. Comm'n, 92 Mich. App. 31 (1979); In re Pearson Kent Corp. v. 
Bear, 28 N.Y.2d 396, 399 (1971)). 
•• 344 Mass. 329, 182 N.E.2d 540 (1962). 
" Id. at 334, 182 N.E.2d at 545. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 272, 416 N.E.2d at 939 (citing Freund, The Use of Indefinite 
Terms in Statutes, 30 YALE L.J. 437, 438 (1921)). 
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however, that the regulation must be considered in its entirety. 13 Because 
the local regulation draws from the language of chapter 41 section 81M, the 
Court examined subdivision control provisions to determine whether they 
define "adequate access." The term "adequate access" is common to sub-
division control laws and has been applied with little difficulty in many 
cases. The Court emphasized the New Jersey case of Mansfield & Suett, Inc. 
v. West Orange,,. as the seminal case for -understanding the concept of ac-
cess. The New Jersey Supreme Court there stated that among the goals of 
the New Jersey Subdivision Control Law was "the free flow of traffic with 
a minimum of hazard [depending] upon the number, location and width of 
streets." 15 The Massachusetts high Court also cited Massachusetts cases 
which defme adequate access as "requiring a way adequate for vehicular 
traffic to subdivision lots," 16 and "efficient access to each subdivision lot, 
for purposes of safety, convenience, and welfare." 17 Thus, the Supreme 
Judicial Court concluded the term "adequate access" was not vague and in-
definite, and was one commonly understood." 
The Supreme Judicial Court then determined that the language of the en-
tire regulation was not so broad as to fail to guide prospective developers. 19 
The Court stated the Castle Estates test allowed for some flexibility to allow 
local boards to make case-by-case determinations. 20 After citing a series of 
cases invoking the Castle Estates test, including cases both upholding the 
regulation and striking down the regulation of subdivision plans, the Court 
determined that if the plan were rejected on grounds mentioned in the regu-
lation then there was adequate notice. 21 The Court found the standard of-
fended only when reasons not specified in the regulations are used to deny 
approval to a subdivision plan. 22 
The case was remanded, however, because the Court found both parties 
had failed to comply with statutory procedures: North Landers filed a 
definitive plan before rejection of its preliminary plan, and the Planning 
Board failed to detail how Sam Turner Road would not be adequate. 
The Court in North Landers allowed planning boards to promulgate 
general requirements for regulation of subdivisions. The Planning Board 
.. /d. 
14 120 N.J.L. 14S, 198 A. 22S (1938). 
" Id. at ISO. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 273-74, 416 N.E.2d at 940 (citing Rettig v. Planning Bd. of 
Rowley, 332 Mass. 476, 126 N.E.2d 104 (19SS)). 
17 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 274, 416 N .E.2d at 940 (citing Gifford v. Planning Board of Nan-
tucket, 376 Mass. 801, 383 N.E.2d 1123 (1978)). 
11 Id. at 274, 416 N.E.2d at 941. 
" /d. at 27S, 416 N.E.2d at 941. 
•• /d. 
21 Id. at 276, 416 N.E.2d at 942. 
•• Id. 
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must, however, give specific reasons for the denial of a subdivision plan. 
The procedure of filing two plans and of mandating specific reasons for 
denial of a plan is required to generate complete discussion between devel-
opers and boards. Thus, while a planning board may consider the effect a 
subdivision may have on the surrounding area and deny the plan on anum-
ber of health and safety reasons, those reasons must state in concrete terms 
the deficiency of the plan, thus providing for a fair decision. 
§ 11.11. Historic Districts Act-Approval of Construction. During the 
1981 Survey year, the Appeals Court reviewed the procedure utilized by a 
local government in denying a construction permit to a landowner holding 
property in an area regulated by the Historic Districts Act. 1 The Act was 
enacted in 1960 to provide for the establishment of historic zones through-
out cities and towns in the Commonwealth to promote historic preserva-
tion.2 The landowner, in Sleeper v. Old King's Highway Regional Historic 
District Commission, 3 sought the reversal of an historic district committee's 
denial of a permit to allow the erection of a sixty-eight foot radio antenna in 
the backyard of the landowner's home. The land was located in the Old 
King's Highway Regional Historic District, which is covered by the Act. 4 
The plaintiff landowner was an amateur radio operator attempting to 
facilitate his hobby by erecting a radio tower.' Many of the surrounding 
homes in the contemporary subdivision were equipped with roof mounted 
radio and television antennas. 6 Telephone and utility poles were present in 
the historic district. 7 Although the plaintiff's home was in the district, the 
home was of no historic significance. 8 • 
Section six of the Act states that no structure may be erected or altered in 
the historic district without the issuance of a certificate of appropriateness 
by the local historic district committee. In Sleeper, the local committee 
denied the certificate. 9 This denial was affirmed by the regional commis-
sion, the district court and finally the Appeals Court. 10 
§ 11.11. ' See G.L. c. 40C. 
1 See Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1960 ANN. SURV. MAss. LAW§ 13.13. 
' 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 609, 417 N.E.2d 987. 
• /d. at 610, 417 N.E.2d at 988. 
' /d. 
• /d. at 611, 417 N.E.2d at 988. 
1 /d. 
• Id. at 610, 417 N.E.2d at 988. 
• /d. 
•• /d. After the denial of a certificate of appropriateness, the landowner pursuant to G.L. c. 
40C, § 11 may appeal to the regional historic district commission, whose d~sion may be ap-
pealed to the superior court pursuant to G.L. c. 40C, § 12A. 
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The committee's fmding that the radio tower was grossly inappropriate 
for a historic district, the plaintiff argued, was erroneous, because a late 
twentieth century radio tower was appropriate for a late twentieth century 
neighborhood. The Appeals Court rejected this argument, stating that the 
tower's effect on the historic district as a whole is the proper measure of ap-
propriateness. 11 The denial promoted the aesthetic "tradition of Barnstable 
County as it existed in the early days of Cape Cod," a purpose of the Act. 12 
The local historic district committee is authorized under section 10 of the 
Act to grant hardship exceptions. The court held that, because the plaintiff 
was pursuing only a hobby, the exception would not apply as a matter of 
law .13 The court also rejected the claim of the plaintiff that the statute's cri-
teria for determining appropriateness were impermissibly vague. 14 
The plaintiff was equally unsuccessful in his arguments based on federal 
law. The court agreed that the Federal Communications Act of 193415 
preempts local regulation of radio signal transmission. The regulation of 
antenna height, however, was held to be a local concern in conflict with no 
federal law. 16 The effect of the Act on commerce was determined not so 
"direct and positive" as to raise a commerce clause issue." The plaintiff's 
First Amendment argument was summarily rejected, because the court 
viewed the Act as a valid time, manner and place restriction. 11 The court 
gave similar treatment to the plaintiff's taking, due process clause argu-
ment." 
§ 11.12.. Boards of Appeals-Relation to Planning Boards. Compre-
hensive zoning ordinances enacted by municipalities are adopted in large 
part to accomplish the separation of incompatible uses, the avoidance of 
overcrowding and the prevention of irregular real estate development. 1 The 
locality is, at least initially, divided into districts in which business, residen-
tial, and industrial uses are permitted. Standards are established for the 
number of dwellings, square footage, set back, and frontage. Permit proce-
dures are instituted for such irregularities as the removal of gravel or soil. 
11 /d. at 611, 417 N.E.2d at 989. 
•• Id. at 611-12, 417 N.E.2d at 988. 
" /d. at 612-13, 417 N.E.2d at 989. 
•• /d. at 613, 417 N.E.2d at 990. In the words of the court: "[a] committee is to consider the 
historical value and significance of the structure, the general design, arrangement, texture, 
material, color, the setting, and immediate surroundings, with a view toward avoiding exterior 
effects 'obviously incongruous to the purposes set forth in this act.' " /d. 
" 47 u.s.c. §§ 151-609 (1976). 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 613-14, 417 N.E.2d at 990. 
" /d. at 614, 417 N.E.2d at 990. 
II /d, 
" /d. 
§ 11.12. I 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZoNING§ 23.03 (2d ed. 1977). 
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Zoning was first adopted based upon the conception that development 
would be lot-by-lot. Subdivision control was instituted for the proper devel-
opment of an area within the locality. The objectives of subdivision control 
are to protect the community from imperfect development. 2 Subdivision 
control seeks to guide the planning of streets, to guarantee open space, and 
to provide for essential public needs. s Zoning regulations and subdivision 
controls are administered by separate boards and authorized by separate 
enabling acts. Because zoning regulations and subdivision controls are in-
tended to implement a common plan for community development they must 
work in concert, not at cross purposes. 4 
In Arrigo v. Planning Board of Franklin,' the Appeals Court examined 
the differing duties of the Planning Board and the Zoning Board of Ap-
peals. In this case the defendant developer, after selling a number of lots, 
held two lots, one with deficient frontage, the other with adequate 
frontage.' The defendant developer, in order to build on the deficient lot, 
applied for a variance. 7 Simultaneously, the developer submitted a plan 
which would govern only the two lots to the Planning Board, also a defend-
ant in this action. • The requested variance was granted by the Zoning Board 
and the subdivision plan was approved by the Planning Board.' The deci-
sions of both were reversed by the superior court. 10 
The Appeals Court affirmed the reversal of the board of appeals' deci-
sion granting a variance.•• The Appeals Court stated ''there were no condi-
tions especially affecting the land in question . . . and that any hardship 
was purely financial and was of the [defendant developer's] own 
making." 12 The defendants contended that the deviation from the frontage 
requirement was de minimis. The Appeals Court, relying on Warren v. 
Board of Appeals of Amherst, 13 rejected this position.•• In Warren, a vari-
ance granted for a two percent deficiency from the frontage requirement 
was reversed because the requirements set forth in chapter 40A section 10 
had not been satisfied.•' 
2 /d. 
3 /d. 
• /d. at § 23.20. 
' 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2101, 429 N.E.2d 355. 
' /d. at 2102, 429 N.E.2d at 358. 
7 /d. 
I /d, 
• /d. at 2102-03, 429 N.E.2d at 358. 
10 /d. at 2102, 429 N.E.2d at 358. 
" /d. at 2103, 429 N.E.2d at 358. 
12 /d. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 522, 416 N.E.2d 1382. 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2103, 429 N.E.2d at 358. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 533, 416 N.E.2d at 1388-89. 
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The Appeals Court then addressed the lower court's reversal of the Plan-
ning Board's decision. The Board had decided to waive strict compliance 
with the frontage requirement because the defendant developer might put a 
dense development of eight houses in the rural area. 16 Section 81R of 
chapter 41, allows a planning board "in any particular case, where such ac-
tion is in the public interest and not inconsistent with the intent and purpose 
of the [s]ubdivision [c]ontrol [l]aw, [to] waive strict compliance with its 
rules and regulations and with the frontage or access requirements of said 
law .... " 
The Appeals Court noted the confusion over the words ''said law.'' 17 The 
defendants argued that the words refer to the Subdivision Control Law. 11 
The defendants noted that the Planning Board had not adopted any regula-
tions and they need only the minimum twenty foot frontage requirement of 
the Subdivision Control Law .U Thus the defendants argued that approval 
was a matter of right. The plaintiff in turn argued that "said law" refers to 
the twenty-foot minimum specified in chapter 41 section 81L. The plaintiff 
states "the Planning Board has no power to waive the specified frontage 
[because] it is a requirement not of the Subdivision Control Law but of the 
Zoning by-law." 20 The plaintiff noted that a Planning Board cannot grant a 
variance, 21 and cannot waive strict compliance with the frontage require-
ment.22 
The Appeals Court held that chapter 41 section 81L requires a subdivi-
sion to have the frontage requirement set forth in the local zoning bylaw, 
but absent any such local zoning bylaw, the twenty foot requirement ap-
plies. 23 The Court noted that chapter 41 section 81 Q precludes the Planning 
Board from imposing more stringent requirements or requirements fnde-
pendent of the zoning by-law. 24 Because the defendant developers' plan did 
not comply with the zoning by-law, the defendants were not entitled as a 
matter of right to approval of their plan. 
The Court stated that persons in the position of the defendant developer 
would be required to obtain two independent approvals, one from the Plan-
ning Board and one from the Zoning Board. 25 The Planning Board could 
waive frontage requirements under chapter 41 section SIR. The Board of 
16 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2103, 429 N.E.2d at 3S9. 
11 /d. at 2104, 429 N.E.2d at 3S9. 
II /d. 
" /d. (relying on G.L. c. 41, § 81L). 
20 /d. at 210S, 429 N.E.2d at 3S9. 
•• /d. (relying on G.L. c. 40A, § 10) . 
•• /d . 
., /d. at 210S, 429 N.E.2d at 360. 
•• /d. at 210S-06, 429 N.E.2d at 360. 
25 /d. at 2107, 429 N.E.2d at 360. 
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Appeals could grant a variance under chapter 40A section 10. These ap-
provals would serve different purposes. In the court's view, approval of the 
plan by the Planning Board would give marketability to the lots through 
recordation, while a variance would allow the lots to be built upon. 26 
The Appeals Court determined that the defendant developer needed a 
waiver of strict compliance by the Planning Board. 27 The Appeals Court 
found the actions of the Board to be in compliance with chapter 41 section 
81R. 21 The Planning Board determined the best interests of the public 
would be served if the plan were approved. Lacking any evidence of a dif-
ferent motivation, the Court would uphold the Planning Board's approval 
of the waiver. The decision of the Court permitted the classification of the 
lots as a subdivision, but no construction was permitted on the deficient lot 
for lack of a proper variance. 29 
Another case in which the Appeals Court defined the powers of a Plan-
ning Board vis-a-vis to a Board of Appeals was in Planning Board of Easton 
v. Koening. 30 In Koening, the Planning Board sought to overturn a Board 
of Appeals grant of a building permit to a defendant developer. 31 The Plan-
ning Board refused to release the developer from certain covenants regard-
ing ways and services in the subdivision. 32 The defendant, rather than ap-
pealing that decision, applied for a building permit from the building in-
spector. 33 The building inspector denied the permit on the grounds that the 
covenants were not yet released by the Planning Board. 34 
This ruling was appealed by the defendant to the Board of Appeals which 
issued a permit subject to specific conditions. 35 The Planning Board argued 
that the Board of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to issue a building permit. 36 
The Appeals Court held "only t!J.e planning board . . . is authorized to 
determine whether a subdivision covenant has been satisfied so that a build-
ing permit may be issued." 37 
From these two cases, the Appeals Court clearly has held that the areas in 
which a Planning Board is required to act by statute are reserved to that 
Board. Likewise, the statutory duties of the Board of Appeals are separate 
from those of the Planning Board and the two Boards may not infringe 
26 /d. 
"/d. 
21 /d. at 2107, 429 N.E.2d at 361. 
" Id. at 2110, 429 N.E.2d at 362. 
•• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2132, 429 N.E.2d 81 (rescript opinion). 
" /d. 
"/d. 
" /d . 
•• /d. 
" /d. 
" /d. at 2132, 429 N.E.2d at 82. 
11 /d. (citing G.L. c. 41, § SlY). C/. G.L. c. 40A, § 14. 
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upon each other's decisions. In the words of the Appeals Court, "the ac-
tions of neither board should bind the other, particularly as their actions are 
based on different statutory criteria." 31 
§ 11.13. Eminent Domafn.:......Preclusive Effect of Prior Damages Settle-
ment. In McSorely v. Town of Hancock,' the Appeals Court evaluated 
the preclusive effect of a 1969 eminent domain settlement on a subsequent 
damages action involving the same land. The plaintiff's dairy farm was bi-
sected for highway construction in 1969.2 Pursuant to eminent domain pro-
ceedings, a settlement and judgment were entered in superior court regard-
ing that taking. 3 The plaintiff received compensation for the land taken, 
one drainage easement, and damages resulting from increased flooding of 
the plaintiff's land that rendered it incapable of use for farming. 4 
In 1974, the slope leading up to the highway began to slide, depositing 
large amounts of fill on the plaintiff's land.' The Commonwealth and the 
town of Hancock implemented corrective measures, which resulted in the 
flooding of eight acres of the plaintiff's farm land. 6 The superior court 
found that the value of the eight acres was $4,800, but entered a judgment 
of dismissal holding that the original 1969 settlement agreement and judg-
ment between plaintiff and defendants precluded any additional compensa-
tion. 7 In the 1969 action, the plaintiff had argued that his land was incap-
able of being farmed and was awarded damages accordingly. The defendant 
later asserted that the plaintiff should be estopped from relitigating the 
question of damages. 
The Appeals Court reversed, holding that the defendants did not meet 
their burden of proving that both actions were brought for the identical 
claim and that the prior settlement is binding. 8 The court also held that the 
issue presented in this action was not proved to be one which was actually 
litigated and determined in the prior action, in the sense of being essential to 
the settlements which had been entered. 9 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2107, 429 N.E.2d at 360 (1981). 
§ 11.13. ' 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 601, 417 N.E.2d 982. 
' /d. at 602, 417 N.E.2d at 983. 
' /d. at 603, 417 N.E.2d at 983. 
• /d. 
' /d. 
• /d. at 602-03, 417 N.E.2d at 983-84. 
' /d. at 603, 417 N.E.2d at 984. 
1 /d. at 603,417 N.E.2d at 984-85 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 68 Com-
ment f (Tent. Draft No. 41977), and Watson v. Berman, 302 Mass. 305, 307, 19N.E.2d43, 44 
(1939)). 
' /d. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 Comment f (Tent. Draft No. 4 
1977) and Wishnewsky v. Saugus, 325 Mass. 191, 195, 89 N.E.2d 783, 786 (1950)). 
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The defendants asserted that, for the purposes of claim preclusion, the 
1969 action determined all damages both past and future resulting from that 
taking, even if the Commonwealth did not utilize the rights it obtained until 
a later time. 10 Also, the defendants asserted, even if the damages now being 
sought were an unanticipated result of the 1969 taking, or there were insuf-
ficient information regarding the claim for damages in the prior action, the 
parties are still barred. 11 
The Appeals Court found that the extensive corrective measures taken by 
the defendants in 1974 constituted a second taking of the plaintiff's land 
and a new public improvement not within the scope of the original drainage 
easements acquired by the defendants. 12 Thus, this separate 1974 taking, 
not necessary or contemplated in the original 1969 taking, 13 entitled the 
plaintiff to damages independent of the 1969 taking.'• 
The defendant argued, however, that even if the plaintiff is not barred by 
claim preclusion, he is barred under the principles of issue preclusion. In 
order for a claim to be barred by issue preclusion, the issue presented in the 
present case must be the same issue which was decided in the prior case." 
The issue which was ruled on in the prior case must also be one central to 
the judgment entered, otherwise the use of issue preclusion would not be 
recognized. 16 
The Appeals Court in McSorely ruled that, "the defendants had fallen 
far short of showing that damages for flooding or potential flooding of the 
eight acres were an essential element in the prior judgment.'' 17 The plaintiff 
had sought many elements of damages in the former action in addition to 
damages for flooding. Those elements which were ultimately incorporated 
into the award did not establish with enough clarity that the issue of dam-
ages for the flooding of the plaintiffs' eight acres was an essential com-
ponent of the original settlement between the defendants and the plaintiff. 11 
This action was thus remanded to the superior court for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with the opinion. 19 
10 /d. at 604, 417 N.E.2d at 985; see also 4A NICHOLS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN§ 14.09(3), 
at 14.262 (Revised 3d ed. 1982). 
" /d. at 605, 417 N.E.2d at 985. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuDGMENTS § 61.1 
Comment bon Clause (a) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978). 
12 ld. 
" ld. (citing Lane v. Boston, 125 Mass. 519, 520 (1878); Snow v. Provincetown, 109 Mass. 
123, 125 (1872); Ryan v. Boston, 118 Mass. 248, 250 (1875)). 
14 ld. 
" ld. at 605-06, 417 N.E.2d at 985 (citing Wishnewsky v. Saugus, 325 Mass. 191, 195, 89 
N.E.2d 783, 786 (1950)). 
16 /d. at 606, 417 N.E.2d at 985 (citing Rudow v. Fogel, 376 Mass. 587, 382 N.E.2d 1046 
(1978)). 
"/d. at 607,417 N.E.2d at.986. 
II /d, 
" /d. at 608, 417 N.E.2d at 986. 
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This case at first glance appears to limit the rights of a municipality and 
the Commonwealth to future use of an existing easement. The question of 
future rights, however, is the turning point of this case. The Appeals Court 
noted the municipality's own admission, by its instituting a second taking, 
of a lack of right to accomplish the repairs under the original easement. 
With the complication of a second taking, the court must address the ques-
tion of whether the parties view the original settlement as ''reasonably prob-
able" damages for "future necessities." 20 Here the importance of a 
comprehensive, forward looking statement of damages is manifest. Because 
the original damage settlement lacked such a statement, the court was com-
pelled to award additional damages because the defendants could not prove 
the eight acres were included in the prior settlement. 
20 4A NICHOLS, LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN § 14.09[3], at 14.262 (Revised 3d ed. 1982). 
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